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increased their role and currently represent around 25-30% of total public expenditure. Thus,
financing autonomous government has become a crucial issue with important financial and
political consequences. The present system is mostly based on grants coming from central
government, while tax revenue are weak and so it is fiscal responsibility. The financing
system can play an important, albeit complementary, role in ensuring cohesion within a
decentralised state. On the one hand, achieving a certain level of equalisation in providing
public services all over the territory. On the other, permitting that all regions can obtain an
appropriate level of self-government. However, it is important to stress that territorial
cohesion requires, as previous conditions, a political consensus and the acceptation of a
common project among the different regions. Financial problems can become political
problems, but rarely political problems can exclusively be solved through financial measures.
Hence, we should not demand to the intergovernmental finances what they cannot do.
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1. Structure and political organisation of the territory
1.1. Basic data: population and income level
Geographically, Spain consists of seventeen Autonomous Communities (AC's), which
correspond to the territorial level of regions. The term 'Autonomous Community' is both used
to refer to a geographical reality and to a level of political government, to which we will now
refer. The basic characteristics of these geographical realities are presented in Table 1 and the
Map.
In 1998 the population of Spain was close to forty million. The population share of the
different Autonomous Communities is, as shown in Table 1, very unequal. On the one hand,
four of them have a population exceeding 10% of the Spanish total: Andalusia, with more
than 7.2 million (18.19% of the total); Catalonia, with 6.2 million (15.42% of the total);
Madrid, with 5.1 million (12.78%); and the Comunidad Valenciana, with 4.0 million
(10.11%). On the other hand, there are eight AC's with a population under 3% of the total:
Aragón, Murcia, Asturias, Extremadura, the Balearic Islands, Navarra, Cantabria and Rioja,
out of which the latter three with a population under 2% (Navarra and Cantabria, 530,000
inhabitants, and Rioja 263,000). In an intermediate position of around 4-6% of the total we
find five other AC's (Galicia, Castilla-León, the Basque Country, Castilla-La Mancha and the
Canary Islands); Ceuta and Melilla should be considered separately, as they are Spanish cities
in North Africa. Therefore it is a strongly contrasting geographical reality, as clearly shown by
the very different demographic weight of each of these regions in the whole of Spain.
There are important cultural and linguistic differences between Spanish regions. While
Spanish is the common language, generally spoken in all Spain, there are regions with their
specific languages. Thus, Catalan is spoken by around 7,7 million people (79% of the whole
population of Catalonia, 55% in Valencia and 72% in Balearic Islands), Galician by 2,4
million people (89% of the whole population of Galicia) and Basque by 0,7 million people
(28% of the whole population of the Basque Country and 16% of Navarra). Of course, it
should be taken into consideration that all this people also speak Castillian (Spanish).
Therefore, they are really bilingual. These cultural and linguistic  identities produce an
asymmetric reality, over which decentralisation must be applied.
Differences are also substantial in terms of GDP, largely reflecting the high concentration of
economic activity in two Autonomous Communities, Catalonia and Madrid, which jointly
represent more than 35% of the total GDP produced in Spain. In terms of GDP per head, the
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and the poorest is Andalusia, with 72.26% of the Spanish average. The fact that Andalusia is
the most populated region in Spain obviously gives this situation a special signification.
Three Autonomous Communities  of them have a per capita GDP more than 20% above the
average: the Balearic Islands (154.48, as indicated before), Madrid (126.52) and Catalonia
(123.64); four are between the average and 120%: Navarra (117.16), the Basque Country
(114.62), Rioja (112.29) and Aragón (108.86); another six are below the average but over
80%: Valencia (which, with 99.75%, is very close to the average), the Canary Islands (97.52),
Cantabria (92.95), Castilla-León (91.67), Asturias (85.38) and Galicia (84.40); and finally
another four are below 80%: Castilla-la Mancha (79.98) and Murcia (79.96), around the 80%
mark, Extremadura (73.26) and Andalusia (72.26). As regards income levels, the Spanish
population is territorially distributed in a relatively polarised way. This is shown by the fact
that two of the most populated AC's (Madrid and Catalonia) are among the regions with a
higher income level, and the most populated (Andalusia) is the one with the lowest income
level.
Finally, two additional considerations should be made in order to properly understand the
existing income imbalances between the Spanish regions:
i) First of all, there have been a spectacular reduction in recent decades. During the
period 1955-1975 the ratio between the per capita GDP of the wealthiest and the
poorest regions fell from 3.18 to 2.32, and the variation coefficient (standard
deviation divided by the average) from 34.86% to 25.30%. During the 1975-1998
period the reduction in imbalances continued, though at a more moderate rate: the
ratio between the per capita GDP of the wealthiest Community and the poorest fell
from 2.32 to 2.14 and the variation coefficient from 25.30% to 21.92% (18.29% if we
exclude the Balearic Islands, which is a relatively small region with a very high GDP
per head).
ii) Secondly, the comparison with other European countries (see Graph) shows that
Spain is not a country with strong regional imbalances; on the contrary, it has smaller
imbalance indexes than most of the other large European countries1.
                                               
1 Vid. Castells (1998), Castells-Bosch (1999), Esteban (1999), Hall (1999), European Commission
(1997).
41.2. Political organisation: a brief description
Territorial distribution of public powers
Spain is a constitutional monarchy. The 1978 democratic Constitution established a
decentralised State consisting of three levels of government: the central government, the
autonomous governments (which correspond to the regional or intermediate governments) and
the local authorities. The autonomous government level is formed of 17 Autonomous
Communities. The autonomous governments enjoy self-government through their
Parliaments. The local government level consists of two administrative tiers: municipalities
(approximately 8,000) and provinces (50). The municipalities are the basic local entities. By
contrast, the provincial governments ('Diputaciones') are the result of an indirect election
system based on the municipal elections.
In Spain there is a very large number of municipalities. This is because most are very small:
more than half (61.46%) have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants, and 25.24% have between 1,000
and 5,000. Accordingly, only 13.30% have more than 5,000 inhabitants. Only six have more
than 500,000: Madrid and Barcelona (with more than one million), Valencia, Seville,
Zaragoza and Málaga. Historical and political reasons could help to understand the large
number of small municipalities there exist in Spain. But there should be considered some
additional factors. Firstly, the very singular pattern of allocation of responsibilities to
municipal governments, according to their size, that allows that very small municipalities may
survive without having relevant responsibilities; and secondly, the existence of an upper tier
of local government (the Diputacion) that plays a strong co-operative role. Anyway, the very
small size of many municipalities has clear negative effects and is not based on strict
economic grounds.
Responsibilities of the different levels of government
The basic distribution of responsibilities among the different levels of government is regulated
by the Constitution and the Statutes of Autonomy of the 17 Autonomous Communities; and,
obviously, by other laws approved by the central Parliament and the autonomous Parliaments.
In any case, such distribution is, of course, compatible with the EU framework and its
Treaties. The Constitution establishes the list of exclusive responsibilities of the central
government. All the others can be attributed to the AC's, if explicitly provided by the
respective Statutes of Autonomy (which are a kind of Constitution of the Autonomous
Community). The remaining responsibilities (the ones not attributed to the AC's) are assumed
by the State.
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affairs, macro-economic policy, market regulation, major infrastructure and communications
and social security. It also has public order responsibilities, though these are shared with the
autonomous governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country.
Regarding the AC's, it should be kept in mind that there are two groups of Communities
which differentiated according to the level of responsibilities. The first group (the so-called
article 151 Communities) have a high level of responsibilities, while another (the so-called
article 143 Communities) have a lower level. The first group is formed by Andalusia, the
Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, Valencia, Navarra and the Basque Country. The key
difference is that they have been given the important responsibilities of Education and Health,
which have a strong budgetary impact. In the future, however, the Communities of the second
group will also assume these responsibilities. In some Autonomous Communities (known as
'uniprovincial' because their territory consists of a single province: Asturias, the Balearic
Islands, Cantabria, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra and Rioja), the autonomous government also
assumes the functions of the provincial local government. Table 2 shows the basic
characteristics of the attribution of responsibilities to the autonomous governments.
It should be clear that in many cases the responsibilities are shared both by the central
government and the autonomous governments: for example, roads, transport, housing, social
services and development policy. On the other hand, although in general the laws approved by
the central Parliament and the regional Parliaments have the same status, the central
government is also able to establish the basic legislation (the higher rank legislation) on
matters of autonomous responsibility such as Education and Health. Thus it can happen that
the autonomous governments have a substantial budgetary weight and important management
responsibilities, but that these do not translate into a similar degree of political and decision
power in their areas of responsibility, as far as some basic legislative powers remain in hands
of the central government.
Finally, with regard to the responsibilities of local governments, the law establishes a
minimum obligatory level of services, according to the population level of the municipality.
Hence, municipalities are obliged to provide the following services: public lighting, refuse
collection, road cleaning, drinking water supply, paving of public roads and food and drink
control. Also, in municipalities with a population over 5,000, the municipal government has
responsibility for parks and gardens, libraries, markets and waste treatment; in those over
20,000, civil protection, social services, fire prevention and fighting, public sports facilities
and slaughterhouses; finally, in those over 50,000, public urban transport and environmental
protection.
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Constitution has logically had an extremely important budget repercussion. The central
government, which represented around 90% of total public expenditure in 1979, at present
represents less than 65% (Table 3). Autonomous governments assume 24% of public
expenditure, and will reach about 30% when the transfer of Education and Health
responsibilities to all autonomous governments is accomplished. Then, Spain has moved from
a strongly centralised public sector to a level of expenditure decentralisation comparable to
those we can find in the federal countries with a similar economic and political set up
(Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Canada, the United States).
Finally, Table 4 presents the distribution of the budgetary weight of the different functions and
the participation of the different government levels in each one of them. We can see that the
central government has a leading position in Defence, Social Security, Communications or
Research. The autonomous governments preponderate in Education and Health (and they will
have it in a more clear way once these responsibilities have been transferred to all the AC's),
Agrarian Infrastructures and other functions related to the regulation of the activity of the
productive sectors. In turn, local governments play a preponderant role in Housing and Town
Planning and Community Welfare (a function that includes locally provided basic services
such as rubbish collection, street cleaning, lighting, etc.).
2. Brief historical and political background
Spain is a long-established European country, unified in the XV century under the kingdom of
the Catholic Kings. They brought together in a single kingdom the former kingdoms of
Castille and Aragón (of which Barcelona was the capital, Catalonia the dominant region and
the Barcelona dynasty the reigning one). All the same, this old European State was never
successful in overcoming the challenge of real national integration as the one that took place
in other nation-states such as France and the United Kingdom, in which the creation of an
authentic national market was accompanied by the creation of a national State capable of
representing and integrating nationally (and culturally) the whole territory.
This did not occur in Spain, and the so-called ‘regional problem' has always been present in
Spanish political history, where some historical national realities have survived the process of
national assimilation that took place in other European countries. We can state that, to some
extent, Spain has been, in reality, a frustrated project of a national State. In fact, it is the
expression of a double failure: certainly of the Spanish State, since it has shown itself
incapable of either nationally integrating these historical national realities, or of offering them
a framework of satisfactory self-government within the Spanish State; but also a failure of
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from it in order to set up their own State.
This reason, among others, explains the weakness and the brevity of the democratic periods in
Spain in the last century and a half. When Spanish political life has sought to adopt a
centralist political system, not taking into consideration the aspirations to autonomy of
Catalonia and the Basque Country, as happened during the Restoration period (1874-1923)
after the 1st  Republic, the instability created by the conflicts with these Communities (which
in addition were the most economically powerful in Spain, the ones carrying the weight of
industrial development, and the only ones with an industrial bourgeoisie needing a more
modern and democratically legitimated State), resulted in the crisis of the system and the
emergence of authoritarian solutions. When there was a prospect of a satisfactory solution to
the problems of these regions in Spain, as happened during the 2nd Republic (1931-1936),
when Statutes of Autonomy for Catalonia, the Basque Country and (in 1936) Galicia were
adopted, the fear of a break-up of the unity of Spain by the more centralist and reactionary
groups contributed to feed conflicts that, in this case, ended up in the terrible Civil War of
1936-1939.
This is why, after francoism, during the transitional period to democracy (1975-1978),
Spanish society faced the historical opportunity of trying to channel an unresolved secular
problem properly. The 1978 democratic Constitution tried to confront this challenge, and I
believe it did it satisfactorily. The democratic Constitution has established a decentralised
political system. The Constitution was the result of a pact basically established among three
different groups: first, the Spanish democratic political forces that fought against francoism
(including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party and some forces and personalities of the
centre who played a relevant role); second, the reformist and democratic sectors arising from
francoism; third, the democratic and autonomist political forces (and some nationalist ones)
from the historical nations (specially from Catalonia and the Basque Country, and to a lesser
degree from Galicia). Probably, as can be seen today with a certain historical perspective, it
was fortunate that many of the leaders of the transition and of this pact had personally
experienced, a long time before, the tragedy of the Civil War. This simultaneously ensured
that the experience of the past was still sufficiently alive to avoid polarisation and recommend
compromise and moderation, while sufficiently distant not to feed revengeful attitudes.
In addition, the Spain of the transitional period had changed, and the old conflicts involving
the 'historical nations' had mixed up with the reality of strong territorial imbalances,
aggravated by francoism, specially harmful for the poorest regions. These regions feared that,
if they were left out of the decentralisation process, they would be further damaged. The
Constitution set up the so-called 'State of the Autonomies'. It created an intermediary layer of
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level of responsibilities in relevant domains of public life (such as Education and Health). As
we have seen in the previous section, its implementation has allowed the development of the
State of the Autonomies, and nowadays the autonomous governments are a consolidated
reality managing large budgets and carrying out an important part of public sector activities.
Nevertheless, the territorial conflicts have not totally ended in Spain, and we cannot consider
the present situation as definitive. There is, of course, the situation of the Basque Country,
with a basic problem of terrorism, mixed up with the 'sovereignist' approach of some political
forces. In Catalonia, albeit from different positions, the main political forces are not satisfied
with the present level of self-government, while in other Spanish regions there appear
different kinds of claims regarding autonomy, here and there.
The Constitution, as an inevitable result of the pact in its origin, is an open framework, and
different projects can arise from it. The 'State of the Autonomies' has allowed a very high
level of administrative decentralisation, but the level of political decentralisation has probably
not evolved at the same pace. By political decentralisation, I mean the capacity for self-
government: the ability to take decisions in relevant domains of public life and being publicly
accountable for them. With regard to this point, there are still important limitations: state
legislation sets limits in many cases to the autonomous margin for manoeuvring; autonomous
finances create a high degree of financial dependence; the responsibility of the autonomous
governments over the administration of their own territories is only limited; there are no
mechanisms (such as the Senate) to facilitate the participation of the autonomous governments
in the set up of the State will.
The 'State of the Autonomies' is currently in a very crucial moment. Federalism should serve
as inspiration for the basic purpose of making union and freedom compatible. In reality, in
Spain and in Europe we are inevitably moving towards the structuring of pluri-national
political entities, in which we have to articulate highly decentralised political formulae, based
on different levels of government, with the existence of a 'plurinational' reality that seeks the
political recognition of its constituent entities. Today, 'nation' is no longer a synonym of
independent State, and the big challenge that we have facing us is to make this effective at the
different levels. In Spain, in Europe and in Spain within Europe.
3. Financing regional governments
3.1. Introductory remarks
9Financing autonomous governments is often placed at the heart of the political debate of the
decentralisation processes. In fact, the discussion on this subject can be an element of
confrontation as well as an element of pacification of territorial tensions. The different regions
logically focus this debate according to their interests, and simplistic models should not be
made regarding whether political decentralisation favours wealthy or poor regions from the
point of view of their financial interests. Experience tells us that we can find all kinds of
examples. In some cases, wealthy regions consider that a centralist State has harmful
consequences, since they are required to make excessive fiscal transfers towards poor regions,
while having autonomy would allow them a higher control over their own fiscal resources; in
other cases, however, wealthy regions have clearly benefited from a centralist State because
the capital effect, thanks to which they have enjoyed a politically dominant and financially
favourable position. There are also cases in which poor regions can fear that financial
decentralisation might negatively affect them, once they become more dependent on their own
fiscal capacity; but, on the contrary, other poor regions may think exactly the opposite, that the
cause of their underdevelopment is the abandonment to which they have been historically
submitted by the central government, and what really favours them is the ability to decide to a
larger measure on its own destiny and enjoy their own political voice, capable to manifest in
defence of their own interests.
Thus, there are neither mechanical models nor concluding experiences regarding who can take
more financial benefit from political decentralisation. That is why, it is not surprising that
when in a decentralised state the matter of financing regional governments is discussed, the
different governments involved easily find reasons to justify their own expectations for a
better financial position. But, since not everyone will be able to reach its goals, political
autonomy should no be based only on the financial advantages it could provide but on an
essential political adherence to its underlying values and objectives.
In Spain, the discussion on the financing of autonomous governments remains open since the
beginning of political decentralisation. Several reforms have been put into effect, and an
important process of budgetary decentralisation has taken place, but the discussion on the
financing system continues to occupy the centre stage of the political debate.
Before entering into the description and assessment of the financing system of the
Autonomous Communities in Spain, it may be convenient to make two remarks:
i) The financing system puts two kinds of problems of different nature. One is the
amount of resources of the autonomous governments; the other is the financing
structure, the distribution of those resources between taxes and grants and the
characteristics of each one of them (notably the scope of fiscal responsibility of the
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autonomous governments). Both subjects are interrelated, but are also relatively
independent.
ii) In many aspects, the relative situation of the different territories does not depend as
much on the characteristics of autonomous financing, as on the fiscal flows produced
trough the central government budget.
3.2. Elementary description of autonomous financing
In Spain, there are two financing models for autonomous governments. One of them is the so-
called 'concierto' model, applied to the 'foral' Autonomous Communities (the Basque Country
and Navarra), which consists, very briefly, in that these Communities enjoy the revenues from
the major taxes, for which they exert certain normative responsibility and the responsibility of
tax administration, and they transfer an amount (the so-called 'cupo') to the central
government in order to finance the services that this one carries out within their territory. The
other one is the general system, applied to all the other AC's, that we will now examine.
Logically, the Autonomous Communities with a higher level of responsibilities have a larger
spending to finance, so that the financing systems of article 151 AC's (high level of
responsibilities) and of article 143 ones (low level of responsibilities) show some different
characteristics. However, they are two phases of the same model, and we will focus the
explanation on the characteristics of the financing of article 151 AC's, since it is towards it
that all the AC's will evolve in the future.
The financing of autonomous governments comes fundamentally from two main sources: tax
revenues and grants (basically from the central government). Tax revenues represent 25.90%
of the total autonomous resources and basically consist of three main kinds of taxes (Table 5):
• Own taxes and fees (4.02% of the total), on which the autonomous governments
have a full decision capacity.
• Ceded taxes (10.50%), that are an ensemble of state taxes (wealth tax, inheritance
tax, wealth transfers tax, stamp duties and gamble tax) whose product is attributed
to the autonomous governments. Those have been given the tax administration and
a certain normative responsibility in deciding some elements of those taxes.
• Individual income tax sharing (11.38%). The Autonomous Communities receive
30% of the personal income tax collected in that region. They also enjoy the
possibility of deciding, within a limited interval, the establishment of the rate, and
to decide on some specific tax credits.
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Grants represent 72.80% of the autonomous government revenue, and they basically (63.44%)
come from the central government (Table 5). The most important ones are:
• The unconditional grant (PIE) (21.50% of the autonomous resources). Although it
is formally considered a participation in the central government taxes (PIE), in
reality it is a grant of a general character, which amount is negotiated every five
years. The amount corresponding to each autonomous government is calculated
distributing the whole of unconditioned revenues (this grant plus the ceded taxes
and the personal income tax sharing), according to a formula in which the
fundamental weight corresponds to population.
• Grant for the financing of Health services and Social services (36.10%), which is a
conditioned grant distributed among the autonomous governments according to
population.
• Interterritorial Compensation Fund (ICF) (1.55%). It is also a conditioned grant
devoted to the financing of investment projects in the poorest regions (less than
75% of the EU average).
• European Funds (8.60%). They are conditioned grants from the European Union.
The main one is the European Fund for Regional Development (FEDER), devoted
to financing investment projects in the poorest regions (less than 75% of the EU
average).
3.3. An assessment of the financing system
The assessment of the financing system can be done from different angles. Here we are
particularly interested in examining to which extent the intergovernmental fiscal relations
have contributed or can contribute to the establishment of stable links between the different
parts of the territory, to strengthen the cohesion and, as a result, to create a more legitimated
and socially accepted political frame. In this respect I would like to underline the following
points:
Basic aims: autonomy and equality
The autonomous financing system must pursue two basic political purposes: autonomy
and equality. Autonomy implies the possibility of enjoying substantial margins in order
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to decide the own policies, and in the field of autonomous financing, in order to decide
the level and structure of own revenues. This implies the need of trying that, as far as
possible, the majority of the autonomous revenues come from taxes paid by its own
citizens and that on these taxes the autonomous governments have a wide decision
responsibility. But this autonomy objective has to be made compatible with an equality
purpose (defining equality according to conventional indexes; see Table 9), to avoid that
the poorest Communities, with lesser fiscal capacity, have to be confronted to a painful
alternative: either to provide a lower level of services, or to ask for a higher fiscal effort
to its citizens in order to provide the same level. Any of those two solutions is
fundamentally opposed to a basic notion of equality of rights and duties between
citizens, which lies at the origin of any political community. This is why, tax revenues
should be accompanied by a grant system ensuring this basic objective of equality, and
automatically implying income transfers from the wealthiest to the poorest regions.
The consensus on diversity and solidarity
Any financing system that tries to simultaneously reach the objectives of autonomy and
equality demands a certain trade-off between both objectives, and somehow a political
decision that finally depends on values and on the importance that in every moment
society gives to these objectives. This is why, any proposal of attributing a real
autonomy to the autonomous governments and establishing mechanisms to guarantee
the equality between AC's must be based on a double social consensus that accepts the
values of diversity (expressed by the capacity of different regional governments to carry
out different policies on matters of their responsibility) and solidarity (expressed by the
degree in which rich regions produce fiscal flows towards poor regions) Gas positive
and desirable.
Diversity has certainly a cost. It puts forward problems of a different nature that do not
exist in uniform political systems. But if a system of autonomies has been created it is
because diversity does not only have a cost but it also brings benefits. It allows the
expression of own preferences, and the possibility of contrasting different alternative
solutions for the same problems, and it finally leads to a stronger political stability. It is
precisely because the benefits are larger than the costs that the option for a decentralised
political system has been made. In a similar way, the consensus on interterritorial
solidarity is necessary. That is, the acceptation that a share of the taxes paid in some
territories (the wealthiest ones) is used to finance the services in other areas (the poorest
ones) in order to ensure a basic equality among citizens. Naturally, this acceptation is
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only possible on the ground of indispensable requirements of political identification (in
other words, of a feeling of membership of the same community) and trust in the State
that channels solidarity. Without the existence of this double consensus -if some do not
accept diversity and others do not accept solidarity- then the ‘State of the Autonomies’
may be subject to insurmountable tensions.
What is the situation in Spain?
In Spain, the financing system produces a very high level of equality between the
revenues of the autonomous governments, but it is very limitative in terms of autonomy.
When facing the balance between autonomy and equality, it has clearly given preference
to equality. The fear to weakening interterritorial solidarity has been stronger than the
will to assure that autonomous governments could enjoy a substantial level of financial
autonomy. The central government has kept the final decision power (through grants
systems) on financing autonomous governments, what has resulted in an important
financial dependence. More specifically, the following aspects should be underlined:
• When examining the structure of autonomous revenues there appears the high
weight of grants (72.80% of the total, of which 63.44% coming from the central
government and 8.60% from European Funds), as well as the small importance of
tax revenues (25.90%) (Table 5), over which, in addition, the decision capacity of
autonomous governments is very limited. Thus, the Spanish system creates a high
financial dependence of autonomous governments from central government.
• The existing grants mechanisms are of two kinds: some try to reach a clearly
equalitarian objective of revenues per inhabitant between the AC's (the general
grant and those devoted to Health); others are exclusively oriented towards the
poorest Autonomous Communities (ICF and European Funds). Therefore, the
outcome of both of them is strongly redistributive.
• The financing system does not produce noticeable inequalities in the revenues per
inhabitant between the Autonomous Communities applying the general financing
system (as can be clearly seen in Table 6), and in any case no significant relation is
traceable between autonomous revenues per inhabitant and the income level
(measured by the GDP per head) (Table 7). Wealthiest regions do not have, then, a
highest level of resources.
• If European Funds are taken into consideration, there is inequality in revenues per
inhabitant, because the poorest Communities are the main beneficiaries of these
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Funds (Table 6). A clearly significant relation of a negative sign between both
variables is also noticeable (Table 7).
• The only noticeable inequalities are the ones existing between the revenues per
inhabitant of the autonomous governments that we have examined and those of the
‘foral’ Communities (the Basque Country and Navarra), which apply a system of
‘concierto’. The respective revenues per inhabitant are in a proportion of 1.82 to 1.
Lack of fiscal responsibility and political conflict
During the last years, there has been a growing concern for the lack of fiscal
responsibility arising from the little weight of tax revenues as well as from the high level
of financial dependence resulting from the financing system existing in Spain. Lack of
fiscal autonomy implies lack of fiscal responsibility. This situation generates negative
consequences in different directions. First of all, autonomous governments have a
powerful incentive towards transferring to the central government any demand presented
by their citizens. Instead of taking decisions and assuming the corresponding
responsibilities in front of its citizens, the autonomous government has a tendency to
transfer responsibility to the central government, since this one controls, in the final
instance, its financing. Thus, a permanent focus of conflict between the central
government and the autonomous government is created, which has a political
profitability for the latter, both whether the conflict is positively solved in its favour or
not. Secondly, the lack of fiscal responsibility makes the task of control of the
government by the citizens more difficult, since it makes less perceptible the link
between the benefits obtained from public services and the cost of financing them
through taxes. In addition, the fiscal illusion with respect to the price of public services
may lead to an excessive and inefficient public expenditure. The lack of fiscal
responsibility also contributes to generate conflicts between autonomous governments,
since it makes the relations of solidarity among territories less transparent, and, on the
other hand, any agreement reached between the central government and an autonomous
government is seen by the other AC's with reticence and generates suspicions. Specially,
when in the parliament the central government needs the votes of the nationalist parties
of Catalonia and the Basque Country, that are the ruling parties in their respective
regional governments. Dependency generates irresponsibility, as autonomy generates
responsibility. Therefore, the lack of fiscal responsibility produced by the autonomous
financing system in Spain is having political consequences of great importance, that go
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far beyond its strictly financial effects, highly destabilising for the autonomic political
system that we want to develop in Spain.
4. Public finance and interterritorial solidarity
4.1. Reduction of inequalities through the activity of the public sector
The public sector plays a very important role in the reduction of interterritorial inequalities,
since the territorial distribution of taxes is usually related to income or the GDP (as an
indicator of fiscal capacity), while that of public spending (services and transfers) is usually
related to population (as an indicator of needs). As a result, income transfers take place
through public budgets from the wealthiest regions (with a GDP per head above the average)
towards the poorest ones (with a GDP per head below the average). We have seen that in
Spain there is a noticeable equality of the autonomous revenues per inhabitant of the different
Autonomous Communities and that, including the European Funds, the revenues per
inhabitant of the poorest Communities are, in fact, higher than those of the wealthiest (Table
6). This means that the autonomous budgets already assure by themselves an important degree
of interterritorial solidarity in the distribution of public resources. Tables 8 and 9 are specially
illustrative to this purpose.
Table 8 shows the reduction of income inequalities produced by the financing of autonomous
governments. In other words, it compares the degree of inequality existing among the GDP
per head of the different AC's before and after the autonomous financing, taking in
consideration the fiscal flows that this one generates between wealthy regions and poor
regions. As can be seen, the inequality between the GDP per head of the different regions
diminishes, in the non weighted average of the different indicators used, in approximately
13% (column C). If we take into consideration the European Funds, this reduction is still
higher and reaches practically 20% (column D). Autonomous financing (especially if we take
the European Funds into consideration) produces, then, a redistribution of income between
regions of a certain importance. A more sophisticaded approach would consist in obtaining
the elasticity (equivalent to the degree of progressivity) between the final income (GDP per
head plus net transfers produced by the public sector) and the initial income. Table 9 shows us
that this elasticity is in the range of 0.89 (0.83 with European Funds), which means that when
increasing the GDP per head in a 10%, final income increases only 8.9%, since a portion of
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the growth is chanelled, through the autonomous financing, towards the other regions (or that
the improvement of the relative position of a region thanks to the autonomous financing is
wider as smaller is its GDP per head level).
But the reduction of territorial imbalances deriving from the direct activity of the central
government throughout the territory is even more important than the one generated by
autonomous financing. The first column of Table 8 indicates that the reduction of inequalities
resulting from the activity of the whole public sector (that is, including the central and
autonomous sectors) is in the range of 33% (and would be around 40% including European
Funds). Hence, income inequalities among regions are approximately reduced by one third
through the interregional fiscal transfers that take place through the spanish public sector.
Then, from this 33%, a 13% is due to the autonomous financing, which means that the
redistributive effect of the central government would represent another 20%. Table 9 shows
that the degree of progressivity between final income (after the action of the public sector) and
initial income would now be in the range of 0.69: when increasing the initial income by 10%,
final income only increases 6.9%, and the remaining portion is chanelled towards other
regions through the public sector.
Therefore, when examining the interregional income transfers it is very important to keep in
mind that a very important part of them does not take place through the financing of the
autonomous governments, but through the direct activity of the central government (2) .
4.2. Redistribution and growth
Against widespread commonplace, Spain is not a country with strong interterritorial income
imbalances. If we compare it with the ones of other European countries, we reach the
conclusion that Spain is placed among the countries with smaller inequality indexes from this
point of view (3). In the European context, and in comparison with other countries, Spain is
more prominent for being a relatively poor country (its income level stands around 80% of the
EU average, and the wealthiest region only just in the average), than for being a country with
strong territorial imbalances. Anyway, in Spain the public sector plays, as we have seen, a
                                               
2 For a more in depth treatment of this subject, vid. Castells-Parellada (1993).
3 Vid. Graph, and also, for a more detailed approach, Castells (1993), European Commission
(1997), Esteban (1999) and Hall (1999).
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strongly redistributive role at a regional level. Fiscal balances between regions are perfectly
comparable and even higher than those of other European countries (Table 10)(4).
Sometimes the discussion arises whether more importance should be given to redistribution
(which would imply to channel more transfers into the poor regions) or to growth, which
would recommend to favour the situation of the wealthy regions, since they have a higher
productivity and can act as locomotives of the whole. There is an important debate, which has
obvious political resonance, on the possible trade-off between growth and redistribution5. Is
not the purpose of this paper to deeply examine the main analysis made or the more relevant
empirical results obtained on this issue. However, it should be underlined that the different
studies do not provide significant evidence in the sense that higher spending in redistribution
leads to lower rates of economic growth. On the contrary, they rather conclude that more
fiscal redistribution could contribute to create strong incentives to economic growth, through
investment in human capital and assurance of  more political stability. Anyway, it is obvious
that more detailed studies should be undertaken to explore this relationship at regional and
territorial level within the different countries.
4.3. Some final considerations
• The development of a decentralised political system in Spain has not taken place
without tensions and conflicts. Many of them have their origin in financial matters.
These conflicts appear in a double front. On the one hand, between the central
government and the autonomous governments (with each one of them individually or
with the whole of them). To this, clearly contributes the financing system, which creates
a situation of strong financial dependence of the Autonomous Communities and makes
inevitable the discussion on the volume of financing. On the other hand, between the
autonomous governments themselves and, more in general, between territories. In
Spain, a special polarisation and radicalisation of the debate has taken place: while the
wealthiest Autonomous Communities are under the impression of making an excessive
solidarity effort and of having insufficient financing, the poorest Communities have the
feeling than the wealthiest ones are treated preferentially by the central government,
especially when the central government needs the parliamentary support of nationalist
parties of the 'historic nations' and the terms of the agreement do not clearly come into
view. In addition, nowadays these Communities have political representatives, the
                                               
4 Vid. also Castells (1998) and Davezies (1996).
5 Vid., particularly, Alesina-Perotti (1996), Atkinson (1995), Benabou (1996), Deininger-Squire
(1996),  Persson-Tabellini (1994), Perotti (1996), Persson (1995), Saint Paul-Verdier (1996).
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autonomous governments, that manifest in the Spanish political scenario in relation with
the interests of their Community. This conflict is strengthened by the big differences
produced by the ‘concierto’ system in favour of the ‘foral’ Communities. The
interterritorial financial problems easily become political conflicts, often politically
profitable for the autonomous governments, which makes it difficult to find stable
formulas.
• Stability does not mean absence of conflicts. It is illusory to think that a decentralised
political system, with multiple government levels, will not experience problems between
those governments. Conflicts express situations in which objectively different interests
are present, or diverging positions regarding the same problems come out.  Actually,
conflicts can be a sign of vitality. It is no good to try to repress them or to ignore them,
since they end up reappearing in an uncontrolled way. What has to be done is to channel
them and to facilitate their expression, to establish institutional mechanisms for their
resolution and to try to transform them in a dynamic element of social change.
• It is essential, first, to establish mechanisms to make possible that conflicts are solved
trough negotiation; second, that negotiation will lead to agreements (new equilibrium, in
some aspect); and, third, that these new agreements will allow to transform the reality,
overcoming, to some extent, the problems that were in the source of the conflict.
Therefore, three main conditions are required: that conflict will lead to negotiation; that
negotiation will lead to agreements; and that agreements will contribute to resolve the
problems. At this point, the design of the institutional mechanisms is a crucial issue: the
benchmark where the negotiations should be undertaken, the actors who participate in
them, and the rules of the game. The problem arises when, as occurs in Spain, the
conflicts produce by themselves political benefits. As well for the autonomous
governments, which can appear as the champions of their community, as for the central
government, that can appear as the defender of the unity and the general interest. This
situation does not lead to new points of equilibrium (always in evolution, of course), but
to the exacerbation of the initial conflict and to a vicious circle fed by the political
profitability of the conflicts. Nowadays, in Spain the absence of effective institutional
mechanisms is a major problem in the relations among different levels of government.
• There is not an immediate relationship between territorial inequality, interregional fiscal
flows and cohesion. The equation ‘more territorial inequality implies more interregional
fiscal flows, and more interregional fiscal flows leads to more cohesion’ does not
necessarily applies. It could be specially useful to distinguish between territorial
cohesion and national cohesion. Territorial cohesion concerns the territorial differences
in terms of income and welfare, while national cohesion refers to the sentiment of
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identification to the same national community. The reality shows that we have examples
of territorial cohesion without national cohesion, and in the opposite way, we can find
examples of national cohesion in situations of strong territorial economic inequalities.
So, territorial cohesion not necessarily implies national cohesion.
• Thus, by itself solidarity does not guarantee cohesion. We have seen that in Spain
autonomous financing assures a high level of equality between the revenues per
inhabitant of the AC's, which implies the existence of important redistributive flows
among regions, which has not prevented neither the appearance of conflicts, nor the
existence of important instability factors. Equality assures, then, a high level of
interterritorial solidarity. But solidarity does not guarantee interterritorial cohesion. For
this, three additional requisites are needed. First of all, that this solidarity is recognised
by the Communities receiving it and assumed by the ones financing it. Secondly, that
the political system as a whole is satisfying for all Autonomous Communities; that is,
that they all find in it the degree of self-government they wish. Thirdly, that conflicts are
channelled through stable institutional mechanisms of negotiation and representation.
 • The financing of regional governments is a crucial issue in shaping the relations
between different levels of government. In Spain, the future evolution of the system
should introduce more fiscal responsibility (and therefore more transparency) to the
regional governments, should reform the system of grants, to achieve an objective of
equalisation and should improve the institutional mechanisms of co-ordination.
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Table 1
Population and GDP per Autonomous Community (1998)
Population GDP Index_(GDP per capita)
% s/total (Millions ptas.) % s/total 1955 1975 1998
Andalusia 7,258,168 18.19 12,068,935 13.14 68.79 73.05 72.26
Aragón 1,181,814 2.96 2,960,313 3.22 98.10 100.88 108.86
Asturias 1,080,103 2.71 2,122,072 2.31 109.70 99.43 85.38
Balearic Islands 801,023 2.01 2,847,356 3.10 125.04 133.97 154.48
Canary Islands 1,639,795 4.11 3,679,858 4.01 72.49 81.24 97.52
Cantabria 526,557 1.32 1,126,226 1.23 115.62 102.30 92.95
Castilla-La Mancha 1,719,756 4.31 3,165,155 3.45 65.96 78.10 79.98
Castilla-León 2,478,391 6.21 5,228,164 5.69 83.37 83.94 91.67
Catalonia 6,154,987 15.42 17,511,487 19.07 159.90 127.82 123.64
Comunidad Valenciana 4,033,902 10.11 9,258,703 10.08 111.95 100.05 99.75
Extremadura 1,069,098 2.68 1,802,331 1.96 55.78 57.90 73.26
Galicia 2,722,637 6.82 5,287,730 5.76 69.93 76.19 84.40
Madrid 5,100,500 12.78 14,849,141 16.17 156.04 133.78 126.52
Murcia 1,119,082 2.80 2,058,929 2.24 68.96 83.06 79.96
Navarra 530,394 1.33 1,429,913 1.56 114.60 113.82 117.16
Basque Country 2,095,900 5.25 5,527,948 6.02 177.56 132.78 114.62
La Rioja 263,512 0.66 680,900 0.74 108.74 104.43 112.29
Ceuta and Melilla 132,467 0.33 226,202 0.25 52.63 68.47 74.02
Total 39,908,086 100.00 91,831,363 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Ratio max/min 3.1832 2.3138 2.1378
Variation Coefficient 0.3486 0.2530 0.2192
Source: Fundación BBV (1999).
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Table 2




* Forestry, agriculture, livestock and fisheries in internal waters
HIGH LOW * Urbanism and housing
(art. 151) (art. 143) * Roads
* Ports and airoports without commercial activity
* Hydraulic exploitations, channels and irrigation
* Environmental protection
* Monumental patrimony of the Autonomous Community,
cultural promotion and of the regional languages, libraries,
museums and conservatories
* Self-government institutions
* Internal commercial fairs, sports promotion and tourism
  *  Education (management of the educational system at all levels)
  *  Health (medical assistance at all levels)
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Table 3
Public sector by levels of government in Spain






1979 88.0 0.1 11.9 100.0
1985 76.6 12.6 12.8 100.0
1990 67.5 19.2 13.3 100.0
1995 67.0 21.5 11.5 100.0
1996 65.5 22.6 11.9 100.0
1997 63.8 23.9 12.3 100.0
Source: Dir. Gral. de Coordinación con las Haciendas Territoriales (Min. Economía y Hacienda).
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Table 4
Functional classification of consolidated expenditure in the Spanish public sector (1993)
(Million ECU's)
State Autonom. Communities Local Government PUBLIC SECTOR
Consolidated total % Consolidated total % Consolidated total % Consolidated total %
1. General Services 2,491 34.9 1,333 18.7 3,311 46.4 7,135 100.0
2. Defence, Civil Protection and Citizens' Safety 8,264 80.5 463 4.5 1,539 15.0 10,266 100.0
3. Social Security, Protection and Promotion 62,192 91.7 3,201 4.7 2,402 3.6 67,794 100.0
3.1. Social Security and Protection 60,167 93.3 2,483 3.8 1,848 2.9 64,498 100.0
3.2. Social Promotion 2,025 61.4 718 21.8 554 16.8 3,296 100.0
4. Production of Public Goods of a Social Nature 18,497 33.8 25,951 47.5 10,200 18.7 54,647 100.0
4.1. Health 10,502 43.8 12,677 52.8 821 3.4 24,000 100.0
4.2. Education 6,684 38.5 9,689 55.8 1,001 5.7 17,374 100.0
4.3. Housing and Town Planning 486 9.4 1,685 32.6 2,991 58.0 5,161 100.0
4.4. Community Welfare 161 4.4 728 19.9 2,777 75.7 3,665 100.0
4.5. Culture 518 14.4 935 26,1 2.135 59.5 3,589 100.0
4.6. Other Community and Social Services 148 17.2 237 27.5 475 55.3 859 100.0
5. Production of Economic Goods 9,041 53.4 4,957 29.3 2,921 17.3 16,919 100.0
5.1. Basic Infrastructures and Transports 6,235 49.3 3,691 29.2 2,716 21.5 12,642 100.0
5.2. Communications 1,118 93.2 51 4.3 31 2.5 1,199 100.0
5.3. Agrarian Infrastructure 255 19.8 901 69.7 136 10.5 1,293 100.0
5.4. Scientific, Technical and Applied Research 1,216 81.9 256 17.3 12 0.8 1,485 100.0
5.5. Basic and Statistical Information 217 72.5 57 19.0 25 8.5 299 100.0
6. General Economic Regulation 3,991 66.7 1,054 17.6 936 15.7 5,981 100.0
6.1. Economic Regulation 1,883 56.0 678 20.1 803 23.9 3,364 100.0
6.2. Commercial Regulation 813 75.7 128 12.0 132 12.3 1,074 100.0
6.3. Financial Regulation 1,295 83.9 248 16.1 0 0.0 1,544 100.0
7. Economic Regulation of Productive Sectors 6,050 69.6 2,232 25.7 408 4.7 8,689 100.0
7.1. Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries 4,580 79.2 1,124 19.4 82 1.4 5,785 100.0
7.2. Industry 902 48.5 801 43.1 156 8.4 1,859 100.0
7.3. Energy 57 27.2 90 43.1 62 29.7 209 100.0
7.4. Mining 402 87.7 55 12.0 2 0.3 458 100.0
7.5. Tourism 109 28.8 162 42.9 107 28.3 377 100.0
9. Grants to Public Administrations 5,358 88.8 339 5.6 338 5.6 6,035 100.0
10. Public Debt 27,015 80.7 2,740 8.2 3,729 11.1 33,484 100.0
TOTAL NON FINANCIAL
EXPENDITURE
131,365 66.7 41,440 21.0 24,267 12.3 197,072 100.0
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 142,899 67.8 42,269 20.0 25,783 12.2 210,951 100.0
Source: Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda: La descentralización del gasto público en España, período 1984-93.
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Table 5
Revenues of the Spanish Autonomous Communities (1)(1998)
as % of total
Tax revenues 25.90
 
 Own taxes and fees 4.02
 
 Ceded taxes 10.50
 
 Personal income tax sharing 11.38
Grants 72.80
 
 From the central government 63.44
 
 Unconditional (PIE) 21.50
 
 Health and Social Services 36.10
 










Notes: 1. Corresponds exclusively to the art. 151 AC's.
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Table 6













ANDALUSIA 241,569 0.9663 292,684 1.0687 1,662,807 0.7298
CANARY ISLANDS 257,654 1.0306 274,073 1.0007 2,244,096 0.9849
CATALONIA 253,848 1.0154 256,857 0.9379 2,845,089 1.2486
GALICIA 271,167 1.0847 294,041 1.0737 1,942,136 0.8523
C. VALENCIANA 241,914 0.9676 252,267 0.9211 2,295,223 1.0073
average 250,003 1.0000 273,868 1.0000
Art. 143 AC's
ARAGÓN 114,698 1.0689 189,985 1.2727 2,504,889 1.0993
ASTURIAS 108,265 1.0089 124,895 0.8367 1,964,694 0.8622
BALEARIC ISLANDS 142,154 1.3247 148,182 0.9927 3,554,649 1.5600
CANTABRIA 109,164(2) 1.0173 141,484 0.9478 2,138,849 0.9387
CASTILLA-LM 93,557 0.8718 193,258 1.2947 1,840,467 0.8077
CASTILLA-LEÓN 108,810 1.0140 178,660 1.1969 2,109,499 0.9258
EXTREMADURA 125,200 1.1667 227,425 1.5236 1,685,843 0.7399
MADRID 108,266(2) 1.0089 112,822 0.7558 2,911,311 1.2777
MURCIA 70,718 0.6590 101,759 0.6817 1,839,837 0.8075
LA RIOJA 100,603 0.9375 112,230 0.7518 2,583,943 1.1340
Average 107,310 1.0000 149,272 1.0000 1.0000
Sources: Escardó (1999) and Fundación BBV (1999).
Notes: 1. Revenues from indebtness are not included nor, in the uniprovincial Communities, the revenues corresponding to the
provincial government (Diputación).
  2. Includes the provincial share in the State revenues.
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Table 7
Autonomous revenues and income level (1, 2)
Independent Variable:
ln GDP p/head
Dependent Variable Constant Term R2(3) F N
ln R 5.6147** -0.0109 0.3063 0.0399 15
(13.3054) (0.1998) (-0.0736)
ln R' 0.0754** -0.3283** 0.9983 7547 15
(14.4766) (2.8126) (0.9981)
Notes:
  1. Definition of the variables:
R: autonomous revenues per head (for art. 143 AC's an estimate is made considering they had already assumed the same responsibilities as the art. 151 AC's).
R': R + European Funds included in the autonomous budgets.
  2. The Table shows the value of the regression coefficients; the value of the statistic 't' (**=significativity for a confidence interval of 95%) is shown between
parenthesis.
  3. Between parenthesis, correlation coefficient adjusted by the degrees of freedom.
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Table  8
Public finance impact on reduction of interregional inequalities (1998)
(A)        (B)(1)        (C)(2)      (D)(3)







Variation Coefficient 0.2229 0.1581 -29.07 0.1983 -11.04 0.1913 -14.18
Gini Index 0.1230 0.0745 -39.43 0.1062 -13.66 0.0840 -31.71
Williamson Index 0.2228 0.1534 -31.15 0.1916 -14.00 0.1869 -16.11
Kuznets Index 0.0963 0.0660 -31.46 0.0837 -13.08 0.0790 -17.96
Non-weighted average -32.78 -12.95 -19.99
Notes:
  1. Final income per head: GDP per head plus net public transfers produced by the activity of the whole public sector, including the central government (TPS:
Total Public Sector).
  2. APS: net transfers produced by the autonomous public sector.
  3. EF: European Funds.
  4. Fiscal balances of the different AC's with the public sector obtained from Castells e.a. (2000).
  5. Fiscal balances produced by autonomous financing are estimated on the budgetary information provided in Escardó (1999); for the art. 143 AC's an estimate is
made considering they had already assumed the same responsibilities as the art. 151 AC's.
      6. In relation to column (A).
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Table 9
Degree of progressivity of public sector activity (1998)(1,2)
Independent Variable:
ln GDP p/head
Dependent Variable Constant Term R2(3) F N
ln YF1 0.2709** 0.6898** 0.9567 287.31 15
(8.0575) (16.9502) (0.9534)
lnYF2 0.0989** 0.8857** 0.9985 8572 15
(12.5140) (92.5851) (0.9984)
ln YF3 0.1583** 0.8319** 0.9904 1334.52 15
(8.4948) (36.5311) (0.9896)
Notes:
1. Definition of the variables:
YF1= GDP+TPS (vid. Table 8).
YF2= GDP+APS (vid. Table 8).
YF3= YF2+EF (vid. Table 8).
2. Vid. note 2 Table 7.
3. Vid. note 3 Table 7.
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Table 10
Terrritorial impact of public sector activity in some European countries
(net tax transfers(1) as % of GDP)
More positive balances More negative balances
Spain Extremadura (+18.35%) Balearic Islands (-8.35%)
France(2) Corsica (+12.52%) Île de France (-4.36%)
Italy Basilicata (+37.92%) Lombardia (-12.90%)
Portugal Alentejo (+26.17%) Norte (-2.39%)
Germany(2) Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (+25.75%) Baden-Württenberg (-4.38%)
UK North (+9.26%) South-East (-6.36%)
Sweden North Norrland (+13.31%) Stockholm (-7.53%)
Source: Davezies (1996) (data of 1993); except for Spain, Castells e. a. (2000) (data of 1996).
Notas: 1. Public spending minus taxes allocated to the corresponding territory.
2. Does not include Social Security budget.
